Joaquín
Mª Aguirre (UCM)
Ayer
dábamos cuenta aquí de la detención y posterior liberación de los periodistas y
editora de la publicación egipcia Mada Masr, así como de la publicación de un
duro artículo sobre la necesidad de un periodismo libre que pudiera cumplir su
función dentro de un sistema democrático. Hoy es necesario ir un poco más allá
al comprobar cuál la reacción del régimen egipcio y en dónde está el posible
origen de lo que ha podido ser el detonante de los ataques contra el medio.
Con el
titular "Egypt's prosecution says news website Mada Masr founded by banned
Muslim Brotherhood", el diario estatal Ahram Online trataba de explicar lo
ocurrido. Como suele ser necesario, el tono en que se ofrece la información es
importante para tratar de interpretar la "actitud", por expresarlo de
esta manera, ante el hecho que se narra.
Egypt's state security prosecution has said
that national security investigations revealed that independent news website
Mada Masr was founded by the now-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood group with the aim
of spreading false news.
The announcement came after plain clothes
security forces raided the website's office in Cairo on Sunday, arresting three
staff members including editor-in-chief Lina Attalah.
This followed the arrest of one of their
editors, Shady Zalat, at his home a day earlier and detaining him in an unknown
location. The four were released later on Sunday.
The high state security prosecution had
authorised the inspection of Mada Masr's office, a statement from the
prosecution office said late on Monday. This followed "national security
investigations which concluded that the website was founded by the Brotherhood
group to spread false news and rumours with the aim of disrupting public order,"
it added.
"The inspection resulted in the seizure of
equipment used in the crime," the statement added.
Mada said on Facebook on the day of the arrests
that nine plain-clothed officers questioned the journalists on site for several
hours and asked some of them to unlock their phones and laptops, before the
three staff members were arrested.
Mada Masr was one of hundreds of news websites
blocked by Egyptian authorities two year ago, but the independent outlet has
continued to publish critical and investigative reports in Arabic and English,
including via its Facebook page to challenge the ban.
The website can be accessed locally only
through a virtual private network (VPN) app.*
Las acusaciones de la Fiscalía egipcia son y parecen ridículas.
El texto no puede dejar de mostrar el punto de vista y la información de la
publicación acusada. Cualquiera que conozca el origen y la trayectoria de la
publicación entenderá rápidamente que la acusación lanzada contra ella —haber
sido creada por la Hermandad Musulmana para expandir noticias falsas— es la "acusación
tipo" que se esgrime cuando se quiere retirar a alguien del mapa egipcio.
La trayectoria de Mada Masr está explicada por los propios
profesionales desde el momento de su creación y han hecho, como se reconoce en
el propio Ahram Online, periodismo de investigación, con lo que eso implica en
Egipto, ha sido voz de aquellos que han sido encarcelados, esencialmente de los
que se lanzaron a las calles en defensa de la Revolución del 25 de enero,
plenos de un espíritu de renovación política. Es un medio joven y crítico, con
información contrastada y opinión en defensa de las libertades. El artículo de
Ahram Online reconoce sus méritos y su trabajo.
Con la acusación de la Fiscalía, el régimen egipcio —el que
se rasga las vestiduras cuando se le acusa de violar los derechos humanos
sistemáticamente— alcanza un nuevo techo en su destrucción de las libertades,
en su política represiva que le lleva hacia la nada, al desprestigio y a convertirse
en un régimen paranoico. Luego entraremos en el posible origen de este nuevo
ataque de paranoia.
Antes es necesario recuperar algunas heridas no curadas del
régimen. Por lo pronto señalar la crisis en que se encuentra el gobierno, del
que se sigue anunciando la crisis que hará renunciar al gabinete para que otro se
haga cargo del país. Como dijimos en otras ocasiones, para evitar la erosión
del presidente (al menos intentarlo), el método clásico egipcio es llevarse por
delante los ministerios y a sus responsables. El régimen no se ha recuperado de
los efectos de los vídeos subidos a YouTube sobre los gastos suntuosos y la
edificación de palacios —asumida por el presidente como una virtud— para el
disfrute de las autoridades. La crisis económica egipcia no se puede camuflar y
el gasto enorme en lujo en las celebraciones se vuelve contra el régimen. Yo
mismo recibí el comentario escandalizado por el lujo y el derroche de una
persona que había asistido a una de estas celebraciones. Poco después surgieron
las denuncias en YouTube que sacaron a la calle a miles de egipcios. Todo se
negó desde el poder hasta que las evidencias gráficas de las manifestaciones no
se pudieron ignorar, por lo que empezó la represión policial y las detenciones.
Recordemos el carácter mentiroso del régimen egipcio. Baste
recordar la explosión del coche terrorista frente al Instituto Oncológico en El
Cairo, que en su primera versión se suponía que había sido una explosión
causada por una bombona del propio instituto (algo que desmintió la Universidad
de El Cairo), para decir después que había sido un choque automovilístico (algo
imposible por los efectos de la explosión), para acabar dejando la versión de
que un coche terrorista había sido perseguido hasta que estalló volando la
facha del Instituto. Con cada versión, el régimen se iba hundiendo a sí mismo
en el fango del descrédito.
Cuando los medios extranjeros dicen estas cosas, son
acusados de formar parte de la conspiración internacional contra Egipto montada
por la Hermandad Musulmana, que para el régimen es una organización todopoderosa
más cercana a Spectra que a otra cosa. La incapacidad (y la inutilidad)
informativa del régimen es notoria.
En este contexto de crisis se debe valorar la detención de
los periodistas de Mada Masr y valorar otra de las noticias del diario estatal
Ahram Online, cuyo titular es "Egyptian MPs back potential return of
minister of information post in expected reshuffle". Recordemos antes que
el diseño del mapa institucional informativo egipcio incluye un sistema de
control y vigilancia triple (tres instituciones controlan la vida de los medios
y los profesionales). Además están las férreas normas para publicar
informaciones aunque sea en una página web personal, que puede ser asimilada a
un medio y aplicarse la legislación restrictiva creada.
La información sobre la posibilidad de que además de lo
existente vuelva a aparecer un ministro de Información que unifique
políticamente la vigilancia es una nueva vuelta de tuerca al sistema. Se dice
en el texto:
Egyptian MPs told reporters on Tuesday that the
potential return of the post of minister of information does not contravene the
constitution, and that it has become a necessity in the coming period in order
to mobilise the country against media attacks launched from Muslim
Brotherhood-linked TV channels broadcasting from Qatar and Turkey.
The post of minister of information was
abolished in June 2014 after President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi was elected. The
last person in the role was Doreya Sharafeddin, who took up her post in July
2013.
Osama Heikal, the head of parliament's media,
culture and antiquities committee, told reporters Egypt's 2014 constitution
does not stand against the return of the post of the minister.
"The constitution just states that three
organisations shall regulate the media in Egypt," said Heikal, who served
as minister of information in 2011.
“If there is a new minister of information, he
or she will be required play new roles, above all to coordinate with these
three organisations."
Heikal believes that the media attacks coming
from the Qatar and London-based TV channels, particularly Al Jazeera and the
BBC, show that they are doing their best to tarnish all regimes in Egypt that
do not belong to Muslim Brotherhood or political Islam.
"In this respect a minister of information
could help achieve this objective in terms of mobilising all forces to stand up
to the media attacks which are attempting to destabilise the country all the
time," he said.
Karam Gabr, head of the National Press Organisation
(NPO), and Abdel-Mohsen Salam, chairman of Al-Ahram, agreed in a TV interview
on Monday that the return of the post of the minister of information has become
a necessity.
"But the roles of this minister will be
different from the past, and I think that these will be to reinforce the
national media, solve its problems, and mobilise the country against hostile
media attacks targeting internal stability," said Salama, arguing that
"Egypt's national and independent media outlets were able to defend the country
and disrupt the hostile media attacks in September, but I think that our media
could do better in the future if there is a kind of collective action in this
respect, and in this respect a new minister of information could be
necessary."
A number of MPs have said in recent days that a
cabinet reshuffle in Egypt is imminent, and that between 10 to 12 ministers
will be replaced.**
Obsérvese bien las fundamentaciones y objetivos. Los medios
internacionales, según esta información —se incluye a Al-Jazeera, pero también
la guerra con la BBC y también con The New York Times, aunque no se mencione
aquí—, conspiran para derribar al gobierno y actúan "contra el pueblo"
que "debe ser preparado" para esta guerra. La demagogia es absoluta,
las razones ridículas. Las críticas al gobierno egipcio se deben precisamente a
su carácter autoritario, a su intento de vender al exterior una inexistente
modernidad.
El intento desesperado del régimen de cambiar la percepción
que de él se tiene en el mundo ha fallado una y otra vez. La excusa del terrorismo
ya no funciona, pero a pesar de ello, se sigue intentando desembarazar de las
críticas difamando a las personas o haciéndolas desaparecer, dentro o fuera de
las cárceles, que según el régimen son las segundas mejor residencias tras el
palacio presidencial.
¿Cuál podría ser el origen de este arrebato furioso contra
Mada Masr y sus profesionales?
Mucho nos tememos que la causa puede estar en el artículo
publicado por Mada Masr el día 20 de noviembre, con el titular "President’s
eldest son, Mahmoud al-Sisi, sidelined from powerful intelligence position to
diplomatic mission in Russia", lo suficientemente claro e irritante para
el régimen por varios motivos, directos e indirectos. La idea general
(incluimos la totalidad del artículo como anexo final por si desapareciera la
información) es que el propio régimen se ha tenido que deshacer del hijo mayor
de Al-Sisi por inepto y por estar causando una erosión fuerte en un periodo
complicado.
Vamos a seleccionar dos partes claras sobre esto. La primera
atiende a cómo se ha convertido en cuestión importante en los países aliados
del régimen, a los que no puede ignorar porque dependen económicamente de ellos
y la segunda por el recuerdo que trae sobre un problema generalizado del poder
en Egipto, que podría ser definido como "qué hacemos con los hijos".
Tras explicar el papel negativo que el hijo mayor del
presidente ha estado jugando esto años y calificarlo como una inutilidad desde
distintas instancias del régimen que no saben qué hacer con él, se nos plantea
el tema desde los Emiratos:
The suggestion that Mahmoud al-Sisi be sent to
Moscow was also echoed in discussions with senior government figures in the
United Arab Emirates, according to the source close to Abu Dhabi’s
decision-making circles. The discussions came in the context of high-level
bilateral coordination between President Sisi and Emirati Crown Prince Mohamed
bin Zayed, who is one of the Egyptian president’s closest allies.
“I think that President Sisi knows very well
that there is a general state of dissatisfaction within governmental
institutions. There are considerable worries inside the state apparatus that
cannot be underestimated,” the source close to Abu Dhabi’s decision-making
circles said. “I think he understands that his popularity on the streets has
declined for various reasons, some of which are economic, while others are
rooted in social and political grievances. Besides, the wound inflicted by his
handover of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia three years ago has not healed.
Sisi will certainly not ignore the growing signs of anger altogether.”***
En estas líneas se encierra una parte importante de los
problemas de Al-Sisi y la constatación de lo que el régimen se niega a
reconocer: la pérdida de popularidad del presidente que, en un régimen
construido sobre ella, es fatal para el futuro. Todo, absolutamente todo, gira
sobre la figura del presidente. Todo se ha hecho para convertirlo en una figura
de culto con la que se asocie históricamente y hasta religiosamente el pueblo.
Del uso de las imágenes de Nasser y Sadat hasta la idea de ser un
"enviado" para salvar a Egipto, todo se basa en el liderazgo de una
figura carismática e indestructible. Pero esto se ha ido quedando por el camino
y hoy se sale a la calle a cuestionarlo. Todo debe ser conspiración infernal
para acabar con los sueños de grandeza egipcios, a los que se les enseña que
deberían estar en la cima del mundo de no ser por las conspiraciones
envidiosas. Es el argumento de los malos gobernantes, uno tras otro.
Pero el daño mayor quizá se concentre en algo que todos los
egipcios pueden entender, que se refleja en el último párrafo:
“We believe the role that Mahmoud al-Sisi has
been playing has become problematic and harmful to the president’s popularity
within the circles of power,” the source close to the UAE said. “The advice was
that the son should not cast a shadow over the president’s position, so that
the situation of Hosni and Gamal Mubarak is not repeated.”***
Todos los egipcios, como decimos, pueden entender el
problema presidencial, el de los hijos. Recordamos aquí un viejo post sobre
Nasser paseando en coche con su hijo y el hijo devolviendo el saludo. Regañado
por su padre, que le explicó que los hijos de los presidentes no son hijos de
reyes, aunque muchos lo crean. Los hijos de los dictadores son peores que los
de los reyes, según la Historia nos ha mostrado en el mundo árabe, de Gadafi a
Mubarak, pasando por los Assad.
Nada hace más daño a Al-Sisi que el que se pueda comparar
con lo hecho por los Mubarak, imponiendo a los hijos dentro de los puestos del
régimen. Pronto les da por trepar, por ser déspotas descarados, por hacer ellos
negocios y sus amigos también. Da igual que lo hagan; todo el mundo supondrá
que lo hacen porque los precedentes existen para algo. Muy malo debe ser el
hijo de Al-Sisi para haber causado tales reacciones.
Es probable que haya sido ese artículo el que ha desatado
las iras del presidente. Las acusaciones contra Mada Masr por su pertenencia a la Hermandad es un ejemplo más de la guerra inútil en la que Egipto pierde siempre.
* "Egypt's prosecution says news website Mada Masr
founded by banned Muslim Brotherhood"
Al Ahram 26&11/2019 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/356614/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-prosecution-says-news-website-Mada-Masr-fou.aspx
**
"Egyptian MPs back potential return of minister of information post in
expected reshuffle" Ahram Online 26/11/2019 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/356648/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptian-MPs-back-potential-return-of-minister-of-.aspx
***
"President’s eldest son, Mahmoud al-Sisi, sidelined from powerful
intelligence position to diplomatic mission in Russia" Mada Masr
20/11/2019 https://madamasr.com/en/2019/11/20/feature/politics/presidents-eldest-son-mahmoud-al-sisi-sidelined-from-powerful-intelligence-position-to-diplomatic-mission-in-russia/
Anexo
"President’s eldest son, Mahmoud al-Sisi, sidelined from powerful
intelligence position to diplomatic mission in Russia"
by مدى مصر
Mada Masr
20/11/2019
Mahmoud al-Sisi, President Abdel Fattah
al-Sisi’s son and a senior official in the powerful General Intelligence Service
(GIS), is being reassigned to a long-term position at Egypt’s diplomatic
delegation in Moscow, according to multiple sources, including two GIS
officials who spoke to Mada Masr separately.
The move is based on the perception within the
president’s inner circle that Mahmoud al-Sisi has failed to properly handle a
number of his responsibilities and that his increasingly visible influence in
the upper decision-making levels of government is having a negative impact on
his father’s image, the GIS sources said.
The suggestion that the president’s son be
sidelined also came from senior government figures in the United Arab Emirates,
a close and influential ally of Egypt, who view Mahmoud al-Sisi’s role as
having become damaging to the president, according to a source close to Abu
Dhabi’s decision making circles.
The two GIS sources — who spoke to Mada Masr on
condition of anonymity — did not specify the length of Mahmoud al-Sisi’s term
in Moscow, but they both stated that it would be a long-term assignment that could
last months, or even years.
A government official and a senior politician
with close ties to the president’s inner circle also confirmed the move.
According to the government official, Mahmoud al-Sisi’s transfer to Moscow will
be implemented in 2020 shortly after his reassignment from GIS to the Military
Intelligence Directorate, where he will be appointed as military envoy to the
Egyptian diplomatic mission in Moscow.
The two GIS officials told Mada Masr that the
decision came after lengthy discussions among the president’s family and his
small inner circle, including Abbas Kamel, the head of GIS, and Mohsen Abdel
Nabi, the director of the office of the president. In the discussions, there
was a general agreement that Mahmoud al-Sisi’s rising prominence as a decision
maker, as well as the increasingly frequent mention of his name in
international and regional media outlets, had significantly harmed the public
image of the president and his family and constituted a threat to the stability
of the administration.
Multiple sources agreed that the numerous
discussions that took place within this small inner circle aimed at finding a
way to facilitate Mahmoud al-Sisi’s smooth departure in order to both alleviate
growing criticism and give him an opportunity to acquire new expertise. The
president immediately welcomed the idea.
Russia seemed like an appropriate choice due to
its close relations with Egypt, as well as the longstanding admiration among
many senior Egyptian officials for Russian President Vladimir Putin’s style of
governance. The government official added that President Sisi has already
discussed the move with Russian authorities, who welcomed the decision.
Among the primary reasons for sending Mahmoud
al-Sisi to Moscow was his failure to properly handle most of the
responsibilities assigned to him, according to the GIS sources.
Chief among them was the media, over which he
has exercised direct control for more than a year. In 2017, the GIS began to
exert direct control over the media through acquisition, purchasing a
controlling stake in the Egyptian Media Group, the biggest media conglomerate
in Egypt. The corporation has several influential newspapers and television
outlets under its control, including ONtv and the Youm7 newspaper. GIS also owns
the DMC television network. Yet during Mahmoud al-Sisi’s tenure, the president
has been unsatisfied with the media’s performance to the extent that he
publicly criticized local media coverage on several occasions, one GIS official
said.
The GIS source also pointed to Mahmoud
al-Sisi’s failure to properly handle the firestorm of controversy ignited by
former army contractor Mohamed Ali two months ago. In September, Ali sparked a
public outcry after he posted videos online revealing alleged details of the
president and his family’s lavish expenditures on personal vanity projects and
accused Mahmoud al-Sisi of direct involvement.
From the outset, Mahmoud al-Sisi was
responsible for dealing with the controversy but ultimately failed to contain
the crisis, the source said. On September 20, government officials were taken
by surprise when thousands of people took to the streets to protest in cities
across Egypt in response to the Mohamed Ali videos to call for the president’s
ouster.
A number of informed sources told Mada Masr at
the time that, on the president’s orders, Mahmoud al-Sisi oversaw the fierce
crackdown that followed the protests, with over 4,000 people arrested,
including prominent activists, lawyers, university professors, and political
opposition figures. At the time, the president was in New York to take part in
the UN General Assembly on the advice of his closest aides, particularly Abbas,
a longtime confidant of the president and current head of GIS.
The president’s son also blundered, the GIS
sources said, when he tried to pull a media stunt by proposing that TV
presenter Amr Adib announce he would be interviewing a guest on his show by the
name of Mahmoud al-Sisi on September 22. The interview was highly anticipated
but it was not until airtime that it was revealed that the guest was not the
president’s son, but another person named Mahmoud al-Sisi, the managing
director of the pharmacy chain 19011. The aim of the stunt was to embarrass the
Muslim Brotherhood, who had touted on their media outlets what they thought was
an upcoming interview with the president’s son. Yet the end result was that
Sisi’s family came under further scrutiny, the source said.
Sending Mahmoud al-Sisi to Moscow will also
help alleviate growing tensions within GIS about the role of the president’s
son in the removal of senior officials from their posts in the intelligence
apparatus since the president formally came to power in 2014, according to both
the government official and the senior politician with close ties to the
president’s inner circle. The process of removing senior members of the GIS
came under the pretext that they were “Omar Suleiman’s men” (the late
intelligence chief under Mubarak) who had no loyalty to the “new state.”
Last year, President Sisi replaced the head of
the General Intelligence Service Khaled Fawzy with Abbas Kamel. In 2017, he
removed Mahmoud Hegazy, his military chief of staff, and replaced him with
Mohamed Farid Higazy.
In late September, one of the ousted GIS
officials and an advisor to the GIS on foreign affairs both told Mada Masr
there has also been growing unease within the intelligence apparatus regarding
the “confrontational” and “extreme” manner in which Mahmoud al-Sisi has handled
various security matters and that he had ignored the advice of many.
The shuffling of top security officials has
even possibly threatened Abbas Kamel’s powerful position as head of GIS.
The government official ruled out Kamel as the
source of the idea to send the president’s son to Moscow, stating that the
political space granted to Kamel by the president has shrunk dramatically in
recent months, including in matters of foreign policy. As a case in point,
Kamel did not accompany Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry on a number of recent
official missions, including the negotiations on the Grand Ethiopian
Renaissance Dam.
“A year ago, we heard that Abbas Kamel could be
removed, as other close presidential aides have, but this has not happened so
far,” the government official said. “One cannot say with confidence that the
president will remove two of his closest aides, who have played a vital role in
the General Intelligence Service under his rule. But we should remember that
the removal of major former figures was not expected either, including former
Chief of Staff Mahmoud Hegazy, who was removed in late 2017 under circumstances
that have yet to be fully revealed, despite information that has been leaked.”
The decision to send Mahmoud al-Sisi to Moscow
comes in the wake of similar removals of security officials to assignments
overseas.
According to one of the GIS sources, Lieutenant
General Ahmed Shaaban, an officer in the Military Intelligence Directorate who
was assigned to the GIS where he worked on media-related issues for years, was
recently sent to work in Egypt’s diplomatic mission in Greece. The move came
just a few months after a decision was made to terminate his service in the
Armed Forces as a military intelligence officer.
The GIS source pointed to similar decrees
issued in recent days to other officers, who have all either been reassigned to
work overseas or to different governmental institutions in Egypt. The
reshuffling has primarily targeted officials within the intelligence apparatus
whose prominence has exceeded their posts, the GIS source said.
The suggestion that Mahmoud al-Sisi be sent to
Moscow was also echoed in discussions with senior government figures in the
United Arab Emirates, according to the source close to Abu Dhabi’s
decision-making circles. The discussions came in the context of high-level
bilateral coordination between President Sisi and Emirati Crown Prince Mohamed
bin Zayed, who is one of the Egyptian president’s closest allies.
“I think that President Sisi knows very well
that there is a general state of dissatisfaction within governmental
institutions. There are considerable worries inside the state apparatus that
cannot be underestimated,” the source close to Abu Dhabi’s decision-making
circles said. “I think he understands that his popularity on the streets has
declined for various reasons, some of which are economic, while others are
rooted in social and political grievances. Besides, the wound inflicted by his
handover of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia three years ago has not healed.
Sisi will certainly not ignore the growing signs of anger altogether.”
According to both the government official and
the senior politician, Mahmoud al-Sisi’s removal from the GIS does not
necessarily mean that the president’s most influential son has “been sent
packing.” The new Russia post may instead be an attempt to hone his skills by
becoming a military envoy in a country of great strategic importance to Egypt,
including in its role in constructing a nuclear power plant in Dabaa.
Mahmoud al-Sisi, who is currently working
toward a doctorate in Public Administration at the Arab Academy for Science,
Technology, and Maritime Transport, according to a university professor there,
is the president’s eldest son. His two siblings include Mustafa, who works in
the Administrative Control Authority, and Hassan, who moved from the oil sector
to a GIS position nearly three years ago.
“We believe the role that Mahmoud al-Sisi has
been playing has become problematic and harmful to the president’s popularity
within the circles of power,” the source close to the UAE said. “The advice was
that the son should not cast a shadow over the president’s position, so that
the situation of Hosni and Gamal Mubarak is not repeated.”
